The Theoretical Gap in Locus Standi for Public Interest Litigation in Bangladesh

The doctrine of locus standi determines who may seek constitutional remedies before the courts. In Bangladesh, this issue is particularly significant in Public Interest Litigation (PIL), where the person bringing the case is often not the direct victim of the wrong alleged. Articles 44 and 102 of the Constitution provide the basic framework for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but they do not clearly define the meaning of the phrase “any person aggrieved” in the context of PIL.^[1]

The Theoretical Difficulty

This creates a clear theoretical difficulty. The constitutional text appears to preserve a traditional model of standing centred on a personal grievance, yet modern public law recognises that many constitutional wrongs affect large or vulnerable groups who may be unable to approach the court themselves.^[2] The development of PIL in Bangladesh may therefore be understood as a judicial response to the limitations of a narrow personal-injury model.

The Early Judicial Shift: Kazi Mukhlesur Rahman

The first important step toward a broader doctrine of standing appeared in Kazi Mukhlesur Rahman v Bangladesh. In that case, the Appellate Division accepted the standing of a citizen who challenged the legality of the Delhi Treaty involving territorial questions between Bangladesh and India, despite the absence of a narrow, direct personal injury in the ordinary private-law sense.^[3] The decision is widely treated as the starting point of a more flexible approach to constitutional standing in Bangladesh.

The Landmark Expansion: Dr Mohiuddin Farooque

The decisive development came in Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v Bangladesh, the landmark case that firmly established the modern approach to PIL standing. The case arose from a challenge to the Flood Action Plan (FAP-20), which allegedly threatened the lives, livelihoods, and environment of a large number of people.^[4] The Appellate Division moved beyond a restrictive reading of “person aggrieved” and adopted a broader sufficient-interest approach.

A T M Afzal CJ explained, in substance, that a person may be treated as aggrieved if he has a genuine and sufficient connection with the issue and seeks redress for a public wrong in good faith.^[5] Mustafa Kamal J clarified that “person aggrieved” is not limited to direct individual victims, but may also extend to a bona fide litigant or organisation representing a matter of public concern affecting many people.^[6] Latifur Rahman J supported this approach by emphasising that constitutional language should be interpreted in a meaningful way that advances social, economic, and political justice.^[7]

NGO Standing and Public Interest Representation

This reasoning also opened the door to NGO standing in Bangladesh. In Mohiuddin Farooque, the Court accepted that BELA could be treated as a proper public-interest petitioner because it bona fide represented a matter of great public concern affecting an indeterminate number of people.^[8] Later, in CCB Foundation v Bangladesh, the High Court Division accepted a PIL brought by an NGO in relation to the death of a child, Jihad, and treated the case as involving grave public injury and violations of the right to life.^[9] These decisions confirm that Bangladeshi courts now recognise that organisations may, in suitable cases, seek constitutional remedies on behalf of affected communities.

The Unresolved Scope of PIL Standing

Yet the theoretical gap remains unresolved. The Constitution still does not expressly define representative standing, NGO standing, or the precise scope of the sufficient-interest test.^[10] The problem becomes more complex in matters involving non-citizens, because some rights are guaranteed to every person, such as protection of law and life under Articles 31 and 32, while others, such as freedom of movement under Article 36, are expressly limited to citizens.^[11] As a result, questions remain regarding the standing of persons or organisations seeking to litigate on behalf of non-citizens or wider sections of the public.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the law of locus standi in Bangladesh reflects a productive but incomplete judicial evolution. The courts have transformed Articles 44 and 102 into meaningful instruments of constitutional justice by expanding standing beyond direct personal injury. However, the constitutional text itself still lags behind that judicial development. The real theoretical gap, therefore, lies in the distance between a restrictive constitutional expression and a liberal judicial doctrine of PIL standing. Until that gap is clarified through more precise jurisprudence or formal reform, locus standi in Bangladesh will remain both dynamic and uncertain.