From an Anthropocentric to an Ecocentric Approach: Reconceptualising the Status of Ecosystems in International Humanitarian Law

Introduction

In times of war, attention is mostly directed at the loss of human life, the destruction of infrastructure, the displacement of communities, and the resulting socio-economic devastation. Aspects that remain under-represented in public discourse include the harm to our natural environment. The effect armed conflict has on our ecosystems is one of the most under-recognised issues in environmental security.[1]

Damage to and contamination of the natural environment are mostly overlooked consequences of war. In turn, these two aspects further endanger communities already impacted by conflict. Although International Humanitarian Law (IHL), most notably through Articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, regulates the protection of the environment and seeks to minimise environmental damage, its scope appears to be very limited, even though armed conflict remains one of the main sources of environmental degradation.[2]

To truly protect our ecosystems during times of warfare, we must critically evaluate the shift from an anthropocentric to an eco-centric approach, ultimately reconceptualising how IHL evaluates the world around us.

The Anthropocentric Status Quo: Nature as Property

Historically, international law governing warfare viewed the environment through a purely anthropocentric lens. Anthropocentric approaches assess environmental protection primarily by reference to human interest, welfare, and survival. Traditional IHL frameworks largely relied on an anthropocentric form of utilitarianism, a logic where environmental preservation was justified only to the extent that it maximised human utility, resource availability, or proper protection, leaving nature with no independent legal standing.[3]

Before the Vietnam War (1955–1975), international treaties dealing with environmental protection during times of war were anthropocentric. For instance, the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land contains two provisions that indirectly offer safeguards to elements of the natural environment. Among these provisions is Article 23(g), which strictly prohibits the destruction or seizure of enemy property unless rendered imperative by military necessity, alongside Article 55, which mandates that an occupying power manage real estate, forests, and agricultural estates within occupied territories as a usufructuary. None of these provisions, however, takes into account the inherent value of environmental protection, as they focus solely on ensuring that belligerents do not deprive their enemies of natural resources.[4]

The Eco-centric Approach: Recognising effects upon the Environment

In contrast, eco-centric theory is a philosophy holding that ecosystems possess intrinsic value independent of human utility. This approach extends moral consideration to the broader biotic community, including ecosystems, habitats, species, and natural processes. It asserts that the natural world has inherent worth, providing conceptual groundwork for recognising the legal protection of the environment.[5]

The eco-centric perspective became part of positive law with the adoption of the UN Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) in 1976 and the inclusion of Articles 35(3) and 55 in AP I. Both instruments limit their applicability solely to international armed conflicts.

The objective of the ENMOD Convention was to prevent the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes. Pursuant to Article 1, each State Party undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting, or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other State.[6]

Article 35(3) of AP I explicitly prohibits the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment.

Article 55 of AP I provides direct protection to the natural environment by specifying that care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against such widespread, long-term, and severe damage. It includes a prohibition on the use of weapons or methods of warfare intended or expected to cause such damage and thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population. It also prohibits attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals.[7]

Threshold of Environmental Harm in International Armed Conflict
Legal Instrument Threshold Standard Application Test
Additional Protocol I (AP I) Widespread, long-term, and severe Conjunctive (Cumulative requirements)
ENMOD Convention Widespread, long-lasting, or severe Disjunctive (Alternative requirements)

However, the ecocentric potential of AP I is largely constrained by its exceptionally high threshold of protection. Under both articles, environmental harm must be widespread, long-term, and severe—three cumulative requirements that must be satisfied simultaneously. By contrast, the ENMOD Convention employs a disjunctive test—widespread, long-lasting, or severe—making AP I’s conjunctive standards harder to trigger in practice.

To date, no international court or tribunal has found a violation of Article 35(3) or 55. Even in landmark reviews, such as the ICTY committee’s examination of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia or the ICJ’s 1996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, the threshold was not met to establish a violation.[8]

The key feature that characterises the eco-centric perspective in both instruments is the preservation of the non-human world as an ecosystem.

The Paradox of the Environment as a Civilian Object

Under IHL, objects can be categorised as “military objectives”, “civilian objects”, or “specially protected objects”. Under Article 52(1) of AP I, civilian objects are defined negatively as all objects that are not military objectives. However, applying this framework to the natural environment creates a fundamental legal paradox. Article 52 was designed to protect tangible structures rather than interconnected ecosystems.

Under Article 52(2), an object becomes a military objective if, by its nature, location, purpose, or use, it makes an effective contribution to military action, and its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralisation offers a definite military advantage. While Article 52(3) establishes a legal presumption of civilian status in case of doubt, environmental elements regularly lose immunity.[9]

To clarify how general rules on the conduct of hostilities apply to ecosystems, the ICRC’s study on Customary IHL provides three key rules.

Customary IHL Rules on Environmental Protection
  • Rule 43 (General Conduct of Hostilities): Applies the principles of distinction (prohibiting attacks on the natural environment unless it is a military objective), military necessity (prohibiting destruction unless imperatively required), and proportionality (prohibiting incidental damage to the environment that is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated).
  • Rule 44 (Due Regard and Precaution): Obligates warring parties to show due regard to the environment during military operations and to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimise incidental damage.
  • Rule 45 (Prohibition of Severe Harm): Reflects the customary prohibition against means and methods of warfare intended or expected to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment.[10]

Even when a part of the environment qualifies as a military objective, it does not forfeit all legal protection under existing law. The warring parties must still abide by the prohibition against causing widespread, long-term, and severe harm under Articles 35(3) and 55.

“Instead of treating vulnerable ecosystems as civilian objects that can be conditionally targeted and destroyed, treating such ecosystems as legal subjects under international law would allow them to be represented by custodians and Indigenous groups before, during, and after conflict.”

A Radical Frontier: Considering Nature as a Legal Subject in IHL

In an attempt to transcend the constraints of anthropocentric protection, scholars have increasingly turned towards the rights of nature. Conferring legal personhood upon natural entities does not mean granting them rights identical to human rights; rather, it establishes them as distinct legal subjects within a legal system. Frameworks that recognise non-human entities—such as rivers, forests, and complete ecosystems—provide them with legally enforceable rights. Crucially, this perspective also highlights the deep reliance of Indigenous communities on the health of these surrounding natural ecosystems.

At the international level, the idea of legal personhood for natural entities has shifted from legal theory into positive law. In 2008, Ecuador became the first country to confer constitutional rights on nature (Pachamama). Since then, statutory and judicial developments have followed across the world. The Te Awa Tupua Act 2017 was passed in New Zealand, recognising the Whanganui River as having legal personality under the joint stewardship of the Crown and the native iwi people;[11] Colombia’s Constitutional Court accorded legal personality to the Atrato River basin and parts of the Amazon Rainforest;[12] while in Bangladesh, the Apex Court granted legal personality to all rivers in the country in its landmark 2019 Turag River case.[13]

Furthermore, interpreting the notion of legal personhood through the lens of IHL provides a groundbreaking way to protect the environment in armed conflict. Instead of treating vulnerable ecosystems as civilian objects that can be conditionally targeted and destroyed, treating such ecosystems as legal subjects under international law would allow them to be represented by custodians and Indigenous groups before, during, and after conflict. As legal subjects, environmental rights could be directly asserted, emergency measures requested, and claims of ecological damage filed with international courts or arbitral tribunals. Furthermore, post-conflict reparations would no longer be allocated exclusively to state treasuries as standard property compensation; instead, they would be funneled into dedicated funds reserved for restoring damaged ecosystems.

Conclusion

The development of environmental protection within the IHL reflects growing international recognition of the environment’s intrinsic value. Our perspective is gradually shifting from an anthropocentric view, which regards the Earth merely as an arena for armed conflict, toward an ecocentric orientation that acknowledges the intrinsic value of ecosystems and living organisms.

The reconceptualisation of international humanitarian law (IHL) to recognise the natural environment as a distinct legal entity—rather than merely an unprotected civilian object or property—is no longer a theoretical pursuit. In an era marked by accelerating climate change and severe biodiversity loss, safeguarding the environment constitutes a fundamental prerequisite for human survival. Without such legal protections, the ecological foundation necessary to sustain post-conflict peace will be irrevocably compromised.

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  1. 1.
    Ahmed Ehsanul Kabir and Shuvra Chowdhury, Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (4th ed, Sufi Prokashoni 2015) 229, 230. ↩
  2. 2.
    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 3 (AP I) arts 35(3), 55. ↩
  3. 3.
    Abdullah Al Faruque, Environmental Law: Global and Bangladesh Context (2nd edn, New Warsi Book Corporation 2021) 20. ↩
  4. 4.
    Jessica C. Lawrence and Kevin Jon Heller, ‘The Limits of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, the First Ecocentric Environmental War Crime’ (2007) 20 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 5 accessed 22 June 2026; Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) 36 Stat 2277 (Hague Convention IV) arts 23(g), 55. ↩
  5. 5.
    Abdullah Al Faruque (n 3) 22. ↩
  6. 6.
    Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, (adopted 10 December 1976, entered into force 5 October 1978) 1108 UNTS 151 (ENMOD) art 1. ↩
  7. 7.
    AP I (n 2) arts 35(3), 55. ↩
  8. 8.
    Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 1996 p 226. ↩
  9. 9.
    AP I (n 2) art 52(1)-(3). ↩
  10. 10.
    Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law – Volume 1: Rules (1st ed, Cambridge University Press 2005) (Rules 43-45) 143-158. ↩
  11. 11.
    Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017. ↩
  12. 12.
    Alessandro Pelizzon, ‘An Intergenerational Ecological Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court of Colombia and the Rights of the Amazon Rainforest’, (2020) 2 Law Technology and Humans 33 <10.5204/lthj.v2i1.1476> accessed 14 October 2026. ↩
  13. 13.
    Nishat Jute Mills v. Human Rights and Peace for Bangladesh and others [2019] (AD) C.P. No. 3039 of 2019. ↩

Cite This Article

Select preferred academic citation format:
Abdullah Al Fahim and Tanzima Akter Sumi, ‘From an Anthropocentric to an Ecocentric Approach: Reconceptualising the Status of Ecosystems in International Humanitarian Law’ (Bangladesh Law Digest, 26 October 2026) <https://bdlawdigest.org/ecocentric-approach-ecosystems-ihl.html> accessed 26 October 2026.
Fahim, A.A., & Sumi, T.A. (2026, October 26). From an anthropocentric to an ecocentric approach: reconceptualising the status of ecosystems in international humanitarian law. Bangladesh Law Digest. https://bdlawdigest.org/ecocentric-approach-ecosystems-ihl.html
Fahim, Abdullah Al, and Tanzima Akter Sumi. "From An Anthropocentric To An Ecocentric Approach: Reconceptualising The Status Of Ecosystems In International Humanitarian Law." Bangladesh Law Digest, October 26, 2026. https://bdlawdigest.org/ecocentric-approach-ecosystems-ihl.html.
WRITTEN BY
  • Abdullah Al Fahim Abdullah Al Fahim Independent Researcher — Bachelor's and Master's, Department of Law and Justice, Bangladesh University of Business and Technology.

    Abdullah Al Fahim is a legal researcher and academic scholar holding an LL.B. (Hons) and an LL.M. from the Bangladesh University of Business & Technology (BUBT). His research interests and scholarly work span critical contemporary legal areas, including environmental legislation, climate change impacts on child labor, and international trade law.

    RESEARCH INTERESTS
    Environmental RightsHumanitarian LawModern Legal Issuesand Contemporary Justice
  • Tanzima Akter Sumi Tanzima Akter Sumi Assistant Professor - Department of Law & Justice, Assistant Proctor - Office of The Proctor — Bangladesh University of Business and Technology

    Tanzima Akter Sumi is an Assistant Professor of Law in the Department of Law and Justice at Bangladesh University of Business and Technology (BUBT). Her academic interests include International Humanitarian Law, Property Law, Government and Politics.

    RESEARCH INTERESTS
    Humanitarian LawProperty LawsGovernment and Politics

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